Both paleobiology and investigations of 'major evolutionary transitions' are intimately concerned with the macroevolutionary shape of life. It is surprising, then, how little paleontological perspectives and evidence inform studies of major transitions. I argue that this disconnect is partially justified because paleobiological investigation is typically 'phenomena-led', while investigations of major transitions (at least as commonly understood) are 'theory-led'. The distinction turns on evidential relevance: in the former case, evidence is relevant in virtue of its relationship to some phenomena or hypotheses that concern those phenomena; in the latter, evidence is relevant in virtue of providing insights into, or tests of, an abstract body of theory.
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Introduction
A body of work in evolutionary biology understands life's history by positing crucial, gamechanging events-major transitions-which explain patterns in the diversity, complexity and disparity of life. Paleobiologists also care deeply about the events and processes which shape life's trajectory on the macro-scale, and posit events-mass extinctions for instance-which play similarly game-changing roles. These discussions are oddly disjoint: in particular, evolutionary theorists concerned with major transitions don't attend in detail to paleobiological evidence or paleobiological theorizing. If their subject-matter or interests overlap this is surprising.
There are many reasons why research programmes fail to be in dialogue. Institutional differences often play a role. The major transitions literature is firmly rooted in evolutionary biology, while mass extinctions are studied by paleobiologists, and flow between these disciplines (particularly from the latter to the former) is rare. Further, although both projects are interested in 'the shape of life' in some general sense, their actual explanatory targets often differ. Where the paleobiologist is interested in patterns as revealed by the fossil record, evolutionary biologists target patterns in living biota. Such factors surely play their part in explaining the lack of flow from paleobiology into major transitions. I'm going to argue that this disconnect is revelatory of a difference in how paleobiologists on the one hand, and some evolutionary theorists on the other, approach questions about macroevolution. As we'll see, evolutionary theorists attempt to provide a theory-led explanation of life's shape. Abstract details of the basic mechanics of evolution are front and explanatorily centre. This leads to a particular methodological strategy: explaining how minimally specified systems might evolve the properties associated with major transitions. By contrast, paleobiological investigations are often phenomena-led. They are primarily concerned with actual patterns in the fossil record, and how these are revelatory of the biological, geological and environmental processes which generate such patterns. As such, their methodological strategy is much more diverse, bringing to bear a wide range of evidential sources. This paper is not simply about the lack of discussion between paleobiology and neontology:
indeed, you might not be surprised at that. Rather, examining the differences between how paleobiologists approach macroevolution and how evolutionary theorists approach major transitions reveals two different ways of investigating life at the broadest of scales.
In addition to shedding light on the relationship between paleobiology and neontological investigation of major transitions, I'll suggest that the phenomena-led nature of paleobiology brings insights concerning paleobiological success. There is an occasional pessimistic streak regarding the epistemic power of paleobiology (and the historical sciences more generally):
given that experiments are of limited relevance, and that the deep past's signal is often biased, degraded and incomplete, we shouldn't expect paleobiology to be as successful as, say, 'experimental' sciences (see, especially, Turner 2007) . More optimistic conceptions emphasize the 'disunified' and 'opportunistic' method historical scientists adopt, especially Alison Wylie , Chapman & Wylie 2016 and myself (Currie 2016 (Currie , 2018 . I'll argue that the phenomena-led character of paleobiology helps explain the nature of this disunified strategy and why it is adopted. I'll begin with first passes at both major transitions and mass extinctions, before characterizing 'phenomena-led' and 'theory-led' investigations. I'll then revisit major transitions and argue for a context-sensitive conception. That will underwrite a discussion of how transitions are treated in paleobiology (illustrated by both mass extinctions and the evolution of vertebrate limbs). I'll finish with a discussion of how conducting phenomena-led investigations contributes to the success of historical reconstruction. In the conclusion, I'll make a few comments about the relationship between paleobiology and neontology.
Major Transitions
Life might unfold gradually, or it could be shaped by game-changing events. Maynard-Smith and Szathmary (1997) called such events major transitions, and identified two types. First, shifts in the mechanisms of inheritance (that is, in information-transmission); second, the emergence of new levels of individuality. The invention of sex enabled genetic recombination via meiosis; multicellularity enabled significantly increased mechanistic specialization. Events like these are important not simply because of the magnitude of the changes they wrought, but because of the nature of those changes: they alter the space of evolutionary possibility itself. As Calcott and Sterelny put it:
Instead of conceptualizing life as evolving through a fixed, though immense, space of organic design, and asking how that space is explored over time, Maynard-Smith and Szathmary conceived of the space of biological possibility as itself evolving. (Calcott & Sterelny 2013, 4) .
A major transition, then, involves a shift in biological possibility. For instance, there are basic limitations on how large a single-celled organism can be. By banding single cells together, multicellular organisms can achieve much greater sizes. In transitioning from a single-celled mode to a multi-cellular mode, then, different areas of possibility space become occupiable.
Why do Maynard-Smith and Szathmary focus on the events they do? They are aware that there are other important events in life's history:
[We] have not included major phenotypic changes, such as the conquest of land by plants and animals, or the origin of vision, or of flight or of homeothermy, which did not involve such a change in the method of information transmission. (1997, 6) What is so important about information transmission and the emergence of new evolutionary individuals? On Calcott & Sterelny's reading (2011) , what makes a major transition major is that it involves modifying "…core elements of the evolutionary process itself" (4). It is thought that there are minimal conditions for a population to be subject to evolutionary forces (Lewontin 1970 , Godfrey-Smith 2009 ). Say, for adaptations to accumulate there must be sufficiently highfidelity transmission of traits across generations. A major transition has profound effects in virtue of modifying these core elements. Heredity via cloning generates a different set of dynamics than heredity via sex, and this explains why life's shape differs for cloning populations and sexual populations.
This underwrites a view of life's shape that is both punctuated and contingent. 'Punctuated' because between major transitions, life obeys a set of rules governed by some basic dynamics; life's shape radically alters only when those dynamics shift. An old business-as-usual is replaced with a new business-as-usual. 'Contingent' because there is often nothing inevitable about the occurrence of major transitions-the right conditions must hold, and these are not guaranteed, and moreover the mechanisms which underwrite and generate the core evolutionary dynamics are themselves multiply realizable ("Different mechanisms may be involved in the origin and the maintenance of higher-level organization" Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 9).
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary made explicit an explanatory regime based on the unity they see in the major transitions they identify: the emergence of new units of selection.
Why did natural selection, acting on entities at the lower level (replicating molecules, free-living prokaryotes, asexual protists, single cells, individual organisms), disrupt integration at the higher level (chromosomes, eukaryotic cells, sexual species, multicellular organisms, societies)? It is because there is this common question that we have found it illuminating to compare the different transitions. (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 1997, 7) .
And the kind of question Maynard-Smith & Szathmary propose is amenable to analysis via the abstract explanatory machinery of population genetics, game theory, and the like. We explain how the inherent selfishness of individuals are overcome in order for a common fate to emerge.
Sharing a common fate makes cooperation of various stripes fitness-enhancing, and thus so too mechanisms which dampen cheaters. Under the right conditions, these can underwrite the emergence of a new evolutionary individual, itself consisting of previously competing parts.
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary's work has provided much fodder for philosophers and theoretically-inclined scientists. Common questions concern the unity or otherwise of major transitions (McShea & Simpson 2011 , O'Malley & Powell 2016 , characterizing the kind of explanations involved (Calcott 2011) , and so on. These discussions will matter later, but for now let's consider what evidence might be relevant to understanding major transitions.
At the opening of The Major Transitions of Evolution, Maynard-Smith and Szathmary discuss a crucial epistemic question: how might we test claims about major transitions? The evidential sources they don't mention are telling.
There are obvious difficulties in discussing unique events that happened a long time ago … [however] we have agreed theories both of chemistry and of the mechanism of evolutionary change. We can therefore insist that our explanations be plausible both chemically, and in terms of natural selection. This places a severe constraint on possible theories… Further, theories are often testable by looking at existing organisms. Third, today's living biota are but a tiny speck in the ocean of deep time: their representativeness, their capacity to tell us much about the past without supplementation or integration with fossil data, can be questioned (Marshall 2017) . This motivates a switch in topic: let's consider how paleobiologists go about understanding life's shape.
Mass Extinctions
Paleobiologists have much to like and dislike about Maynard-Smith and Szathmary's picture. The implications of periodicity for evolutionary biology are profound. The most obvious is that the evolutionary system is not "alone" in the sense that it is partially dependent upon external influences more profoundly than the local and regional environmental changes normally considered. (805) That is, the biology-focused machinery of evolutionary theory is insufficient to explain life on the macro-scale, due to non-biological sources of contingency (McConwell & Currie 2017 ).
Further, mass extinctions make a difference:
With kill rates of species estimated to have been as high as 77% and 96% for the largest extinctions, the biosphere is forced through narrow bottlenecks and the recovery from these events is usually accompanied by fundamental changes in biotic composition.
Without these perturbations, the general course of macroevolution could have been very The distinction between phenomena-led and theory-led can be made precise by appeal to evidential relevance 3 . Ingo Brigandt (2010) and Alan Love (2006) argue that the explanatory or evidential role some information may play in an investigation depends on context, specifically the 'problem agenda' at hand. Problem agendas set criteria for explanatory adequacy, which govern the roles different evidence or data might play. Here's Love on problem agendas:
[a problem agenda] is a "list" of interrelated questions (both empirical and conceptual) that are united by some connection to natural phenomena. For example, how do questions concerning greenhouse gas contributions from plant respiration, along with many other questions about emission-related phenomena (anthropogenic or otherwise), including their interaction with systematic cycling and atmospheric dynamics, get answered with respect to global warming phenomena? (877).
Such problem agendas are structured by 'general criteria of explanatory adequacy' which set which kinds of questions should be answered (and how) within that agenda. Brigandt takes some lines of evidence to form the 'core' of a research agenda: they provision the explanation of the phenomena in question, while other lines of evidence play supporting roles. How this operates is best demonstrated via exemplar, so let's turn again to our problem agendas: mass extinctions and major transitions as described in the previous two sections.
Major transitions, as described thus far, is a problem agenda built around questions concerning the 'rules' of evolution: that is, how evolutionary individuals, populations and the mechanisms of heritability change over time. hypotheses about the fates of particular lineages, general trajectories, and the biotic and abiotic causes of extinctions. As such, the modeling and neontological studies favored by the major transitions folk are often valuable (particularly in hypothesizing about potential mechanisms or processes), but so also is long-range fossil and paleoclimatological evidence.
So, we can distinguish between phenomena-led investigations, where the problem agenda appeals to some 'phenomena', that is, a possibly re-occurring occurrence that is observed or measured; and theory-led investigations, where the problem agenda appeals to a specific body of theory. It is important to note that this distinction is not the same as that traditionally drawn between 'experimental' and 'theoretical' science, or between 'natural history' and 'nomothetic science', or between 'hypothesis-driven' and 'data-driven' science. Phenomena-led investigations are rich in hypotheses, make use of theory (perhaps even laws!), and do not necessarily require extensive data-gathering prior to forming hypotheses; theory-led investigations are not necessarily impractical, divorced from the world, or speculative. The difference turns on whether it is phenomena or theory which set the problem agenda-provisions the explanatory core-and thus sets the criteria for adequacy. Continuing from this, the distinction doesn't turn on the intentions of scientists, but the structure of their investigations. Further, the distinction is not necessarily discrete nor complete: although some investigations may be more 'purely' phenomena-or theory-led, it is not part of my view that any particular investigation can be slotted neatly into either category. Note also that investigations may be dynamic regarding their being theory-led or phenomena-led: one may shift between the two. In fact, I'll provide some reason to think this is happening for major transitions below.
With this distinction on the table, we can restate a preliminary result: By my analysis, paleontological evidence is not included in discussion of major transitions for good reason. For theory-led investigations, evidence is relevant when it provides constraints on both how a minimal system ought to be specified, and on the capacities of those systems. For phenomenaled investigations, evidential relevance is due to explanatory features of the phenomena at hand.
The theory-led nature of the major transitions literature renders much paleontological evidence irrelevant.
Narrow & Broad Conceptions of Major Transitions
Since Maynard-Smith & Szathmary's original publication, conceptual discussion of major transitions centred on a tension between the desire for a unified or theoretically grounded notion and a desire for completeness-that is, to capture the events which in fact shaped life. In this section, I offer a way of understanding these differences, and critically examine various responses to that tension. set of sources enables the accounts' theoretical unity, and thus its capacity to be theory-led.
There is a cost however: many events which certainly mattered deeply for life's history do not count as major transitions, and for some the unity achieved isn't sufficient. Szathmary himself attempts to develop a broader account (2015) while attempting to retain theoretical unity, while O'Malley and Powell stress two senses in which 'major transitions' are incomplete:
(1) Missing events that do not fit the… criterion, but which are so transformative from a macroevolutionary perspective that they must be included, and (2) However, even if a theoretically-unified research program is available, it doesn't follow from this that this program is satisfactory. O'Malley and Powell point to biotic events which don't fit within the framework and yet surely count as major events in the history of life. And although mass extinctions are perhaps not as dramatic as the Earth's oxygenation, it is hard to ignore the end-Permian extinction's culling of 96% of all marine species. Based on similar considerations as hold for the atmosphere's oxygenation, ignoring these major biotic events in the service of theoretical unity looks perverse. But this complaint too is, I think, far too quick: Maynard-Smith and Szathmary never claimed that their conception of major transitions is intended to cover all of the game-changing events; just an interesting, theoretically unified sub-set of them. As we saw in the introduction, they explicitly do not claim exclusivity. (Similar might be said of the charge that the major transitions literature re-creates a 'great chain of being', marching to the human zenith of evolution. So long as the view is not taken to be exclusionary, much of this objection's teeth are removed, at least in principle: it could be that in practice such conceptions encourage problematic thinking) 4 .
On this kind of view, 'major transitions' is a term of art which picks out a particular, interesting, and theoretically unified set of events in life's history.
Pay-offs
Although I think the objections considered above are unfounded, I do think there is a more pressing worry regarding whether the major transitions approach is, or even can, fulfil some of its promise. To see why, distinguish between two kinds of benefits we might gain from the major transitions literature 5 . One set concerns theoretical pay-offs: investigation of relatively narrow conceptions of major transitions will increase our understanding of evolutionary theory. Another set concerns explanatory pay-offs: the idea that we will explain the actual shape of life using the theoretical machinery of major transitions. I think it the theoretical pay-offs have been bountiful, but I have doubts concerning explanatory pay-offs. As we'll see, explanations targeting the traditional major transitions do not turn on the machinery of that theory-driven investigation. In fact, we see signs of switching from a theory-led investigation to a phenomena-led investigation.
If how we explain major transitions as narrowly conceived doesn't have the payoff it is supposed to, then the phenomena becomes, it strikes me, considerably less interesting, even by its proponent's own lights.
The benefit of the original framework wasn't simply supposed to be identifying a theoretically unified set of phenomena, or an opportunity to probe and understand evolutionary theory, but to provision a set of common explanatory resources applicable to actual history. And According to Szathmary, the evolution of eukaryotes is a major transition: the energetic advantages endowed by mitochondria allowed a larger number of genes and lower death rates, and thus more space for evolutionary experimentation. Thus, the space of evolution morphed (however, see Booth & Doolittle 2015) . Moreover, it occurred via egalitarian combination.
However, the nature of the transition is hotly contested, and turns crucially on matters of phylogenetic order: whether phagocytosis and other distinctive eukaryotic features emerged prior to the acquisition of mitochondria or vice-versa. The details are not my concern here, but note that the answer to this question-critical for explaining the major transition-turns not on game theoretic machinery, but rather on energy demands. "The major argument against the phagocytosis-early scenario is once again energetic. According to this view, the boost provided by mitochondria not only was necessary for the evolution of very complex eukaryotic genomes, but also was essential for the origin of the eukaryotic condition" (10107). In other words, the To my mind, this explanation diverges far from positing the emergence of a new hereditary mechanism or evolutionary individual in light of quashing evolutionary pressures against cooperation. Instead, a complex battery of both particular details about hominid evolution (the evolution of grandmothers, the particular timing of language evolving) are interwoven with the models of evolutionary theory to generate a complex narrative. Theory plays important roles, but it does not lead: relevance is set by the event itself, be it hominid evolution or the emergence of eukaryotes. The main action lies in the phenomena.
Recall that evidential relevance tells between phenomena-led and theory-led investigation: in distinguishing the two, we ask whether relevance turns on relationship to theory, or to phenomena. In Szathmary's discussion relevance does not turn on testing theoretical machinery, or applying that machinery to particular cases. If it did, then the energy demands of phagocytosis or the role of grandmothers in hominid social groups would be irrelevant. Rather, relevance is set by the particular phenomena targeted: the evolution of hominid-style cooperation, or the emergence of the prokaryotic cell. The simple, model-based narratives give way to complex, detailed narratives 6 . There is no problem with this in and of itself (I would be tempted to call it an improvement) but it does undermine Szathmary's claims to theoretical unity. The course of investigation bucks attempts to maintain the theoretical and explanatory advantages which supposedly justify retaining a narrow conception of major transitions. The explanatory pay-offs of major transitions as narrowly conceived, then, have been overstated.
Are Mass Extinctions Major Transitions?
Hopefully you won't be too disappointed to learn that the answer to whether mass extinctions are major transitions is: it depends. Let's summarize the arguments of this section thus far. There are theoretically principled ways of delineating major transitions by restricting both sources and outcomes. Any theoretically unified way of carving up the space is likely to exclude biotic events which made a crucial macroevolutionary difference; this shouldn't be surprising, as being exhaustive was never part of the major transitions project. However, if
Szathmary's development is representative, claims to theoretical and explanatory unity are undermined as the details of particular cases swamp the apparent simplicity of the abstract explanatory schemas which motivated the project in the first place.
It strikes me that a natural response to this is to accept that what counts as a major transition is to at least some extent context sensitive 7 . In particular, answering whether some phenomenon is a major transition requires specifying a set of sources and a set of outcomes. Coarsely, do we mean major transitions in a narrow, or a broad, sense? The accounts of major transitions that I have surveyed discount major extinctions and yet, if we are sufficiently permissive on the outcome side, it is plausible that the occurrence of mass extinctions, in virtue of their influence on life's shape, can be viewed as major transitions. However, as discussed above, they are not likely to be theoretically unified: investigation of mass extinctions have followed the same pattern as we saw in Szathmary's development of major transitions. They call for detailed, complex explanations.
That is, we have on our hands a phenomena-led investigation. Which leads us to ask: what is the benefit of such investigations? Why not simply prefer the theoretical unity and simple narratives of either the original view or a more restricted set of sources (such as transitions in individuality)? I've previously argued that the world's complexity forces us into complex explanations (Currie 2014) . Here, I want to say something more positive. I'll demonstrate a crucial advantage of phenomena-led investigation: it allows a wider scope of information to be relevant.
As such, I'll argue, it plays a crucial role in the investigative strategies which allow historical scientists to succeed despite the apparent paucity and incompleteness of their evidence. To show this, I want to first consider another set of (perhaps major) transitions of intimate concern to paleobiologists, but traditionally not part of the canon: the evolution of limb morphology.
Second, I'll connect phenomena-led investigation to Chapman & Wylie's account of success in archaeology.
Major Transitions in Paleobiology
I want to claim that phenomena-led investigations are a feature of the strategies paleobiologists adopt when gaining empirical traction on deep time, so it is crucial to see that my point is not restricted to the corner of paleobiology concerning mass extinctions. As such, in this section I want to present another paleontological case study where (1) the investigative target has some claim to being a major transition insofar as it is a biotic event the occurrence of which made a difference to macroevolutionary pattern, (2) the investigation is phenomena-led. I'll emphasize how the phenomena-led character of the investigation enables the relevance of a vast array of empirical information. This evidential plurality, I'll argue, is a major benefit of adopting a phenomena-led strategy.
Vertebrate paleobiologists often focus on 'organogenesis', the evolution of the vertebrate limb. The transformation from fins to limbs enabled the flourishing of terrestrial vertebrate life; the transformation from forelimbs into wings enabled their taking to the skies. Here, I want to focus on an apparently more humble transition: from median to paired fins. There is a lot to be said about explanations of evolutionary novelty, and the relationship between paleobiology and evolutionary developmental biology, but here is not the place. The point of the example is to demonstrate another paleobiological investigation which is phenomena-led and highlight that phenomena-led investigations maximize evidence plurality.
Agnatha such as lampreys and hag-fishes are extant reminders of the primitive, jawless state from which more derived fish (including ourselves) evolved. These critters sport fins, but they are 'median' fins: lined along the fish's back. In derived fish, some fins are paired: instead of aligning along the back, they are partnered and jut out horizontally. Pieretti et al (2015) summarize how the hypotheses were first developed in light of embryological studies of sharks, and how "evidence accumulated over the past 120 years has helped evaluate these two hypotheses and assess new fossil, developmental, and molecular data from a variety of species that combine to reveal a third scenario for the origins of paired fins" (4872). They discuss a smorgasbord of evidence. This evidence includes studies of morphological similarity: for instance, the similarity between gill structures and pectoral girdles (which support paired fins) in sharks is taken to favour the gill-arch hypothesis. It includes molecular developmental evidence: Gillis et al (2009) 
The Paradox of Material Evidence
Alison Wylie has emphasized the capacity of material remains in archaeology to be epistemically transformative: archaeological objects frequently refuse to bow to our theoretical expectations (2002) . With Bob Chapman, she develops this as the 'paradox of material evidence' 8 A reviewer keenly asks whether the conceptual machinery of the major transitions literature has been incorporated into the methodological omnivory of paleobiology. Certainly to some extent: game theory and population genetics have always played a role in paleobiology. Although I haven't looked systematically, my hunch is that this machinery is more often used to highlight explanatory targets for paleobiological investigation than to directly inform reconstruction. For instance, a recent collection on 'major transitions' in paleoanthropology certainly takes the notion in a broad sense (Foley et al 2016) . The articles pick out potential game-changers (the use of stone tools, differences in maturation age between hominids and close relatives, developmental plasticity, etc…), only a few are plausibly tied to the narrow definition above, and although narrow transitions might frame the discussions, they tend to take a back seat.
(2016). The paradox emphasises the transience and incompleteness of archaeological evidence on the one hand, and its capacity to be a fulcrum around which archaeological hypotheses turn nonetheless: "... how stubbornly recalcitrant these data can be, no matter how entrenched their assumed meaning..." (Chapman & Wylie, 2016, 5) . This is a feature of paleobiology too. Although some areas, most notably invertebrate paleobiology, are increasingly marked by large data sets, significant areas of the discipline still remain trace-poor. Yet the capacity of material remains to be transformative is maintained.
Under the right conditions, single, incomplete finds can underwrite well-founded, bold claims (such as single mammalian teeth being sufficient to identify hitherto unknown genus, see Currie 2018, chapter 1). Under the right conditions, the discovery of new traces can act as 'smoking guns', strongly favouring one hypothesis over another (Cleland 2002 (Cleland , 2011 . Like archaeology, it is a prima facie mystery how paleobiological evidence, incomplete, biased and degraded as it may be, is able to carry us so far into the past.
Chapman and Wylie resolve the paradox by denying that archaeology has solid, immutable foundations in the sense of their being self-warranting, instead arguing that the foundations of reconstruction and interpretation are provisional and dynamic. The idea is that theory in archaeology doesn't play the kind of overarching, determining, role that it might in other disciplines. As Wylie says, Evidential claims may never figure as incontrovertible epistemic foundations, but they do function as a scaffolding, a contingent stopping point in warranting arguments. The question to ask of them is not whether they meet an ideal standard of epistemic infallibility, but how to make best use of the resources at hand to adjudicate their credibility. (Wylie 2011, 380) .
And with Chapman, Neither these data nor the evidential claims based on them constitute a self-warranting empirical foundation, and yet they can powerfully challenge and constrain the reconstructive and explanatory claims we project onto the cultured past. (Chapman & Wylie 2016, 6 ).
In other words, it is because there is no ultimate, stable foundation-that the discussion between theory and material remains is dynamic and two-directional-that archaeological (and, I suggest, paleontological) remains are able to speak. Seeing that paleobiological (and, presumably, archaeological) investigations are phenomena-led, I think, deepens Chapman & Wylie's point.
Phenomena-led investigations are such because the relevance of evidence turns on relationships between phenomena and hypotheses pertaining to them; evidence is relevant to theory-led investigations in virtue of relationship with theory. Theories are often explored and tested by being concretized in simple systems: both computational models and controlled experimental systems (see, for instance, Currie forthcoming). Due to theory's abstractness and precision, the relevance of actual, longitudinal empirical detail gathered from observations of natural phenomena is often limited. Moreover, the explanations provisioned are, if not 'how possibly' than at least concerned with a modal breadth that outpaces the actual history of life, or nearby counterfactuals concerning it. As such, the range of potential evidence pertaining to the phenomena of macroevolutionary pattern differs (and is of a different nature) from the range of potential evidence pertaining to evolutionary theories of individuality and heredity. There is an asymmetry, then, between theory-led and phenomena-led investigations. Where the latter is of limited value to the former, the lessons, evidence and perspectives of the former are often happily relevant to the latter. We saw this in Szathmary's updated discussion of the major transitions: although the explanations have become significantly more detailed and disunified, they have not jettisoned the modelling approaches so constitutive of the original approach to major transitions. Rather, they are integrated into complex narratives, and supported on the basis of a 'confluence' of differing evidence (Currie 2018, chapter 6) . Theories, for phenomena-led investigations, do not form a fundamental, unquestioned and unquestionable basis, then, but as Wylie emphasizes, play supporting, scaffolding, and warranting roles.
The upshot of this is that phenomena-led investigations have a potentially larger base of relevant evidence than theory-led investigations. I'm not sure whether this is true in principle, but if the case studies we've looked at here are any guide, it is at least frequently the case. Given that paleobiologists and other historical scientists often face limited evidence, and tend to adopt consilience-based, multiple-lines-of-evidence strategies in light of this (Forber & Griffith 2011), phenomena-led investigations are a good strategy as they maximize the amount and variety of evidence.
It is pursuing phenomena-led investigations, then, which enables historical scientists to adopt the opportunistic, pluralistic and methodologically omnivorous strategy which underwrites their success. Further, because phenomena-led investigations treat theory not as a fundamental bedrock but rather place it in a supporting role in helping characterize, evidence and explain target phenomena, they enable the solution to the paradox of material evidence Chapman & Wylie sketch. Material remains are resistant to theory because the structure of paleobiological and archaeological investigation involves provisional theory; it is phenomena-led.
Conclusion
Major transitions are not natural kinds. There is no foreordained set of moments which count as 'major' abstracted from investigative context: even if the evolution of paired fins was not game-changing at the scale of the great oxygenation event or the emergence of eukaryotes, it unquestionably changed the game vis-à-vis the radiation and history of vertebrates. Indeed, I
don't need to see the history of life as a march towards the apex of humanity to see the mass extinction at the close of the Cretaceous as a momentous event which profoundly affected life's shape. Which restrictions we should place on the sources and the outcomes of transitions turns in part on what we're interested in and other features of our investigative context. I have suggested that much paleobiological evidence is irrelevant to the major transitions literature. This is surprising. You might be wondering: do I want to say that the latter is, properlyspeaking, autonomous of the former? Not necessarily. There are some discussions which suggest that paleobiology and neontology ought to be integrated in various ways -for instance that paleobiology deserves a seat at the 'high table' of evolutionary theory (Sepkoski & Ruse 2009); while others have suggested that paleobiology and evolutionary theory provide autonomous explanations (Grantham 1999) . I'll close by drawing on Angela Potochnik's work to sketch a fairly conciliatory relationship between the two.
Potochnik (2010) argues that the optimality approach characteristic of population genetics, and the more mechanistic strategy of evolutionary developmental biology, have independent explanatory goals. Where the former aims to explain how fitter traits become prevalent in a population over generations, the latter aims to explain how traits might (or might not) arise over evolutionary time. As such, different features matter, and so the details relevant for one purpose can often be black-boxed when pursuing another. I think a similar thing might be said concerning the relationship between traditional major transitions and mass extinctions. Accounting for a major transition involves explaining how a population could shift from being a border -line evolutionary individual to a paradigm evolutionary individual. Such explanations are abstracted from, for instance, the extinction events that may have triggered or enabled them (the relationship is not symmetrical, however: explanations of mass extinctions sometimes appeal to theories and models which are the bread-and-butter of major transitions).
However, Potochnik argues that population genetics and evolutionary developmental biology are interdependent epistemically. Sometimes, what goes on in the black boxes matters to whether a particular explanation is true: so, it might be that the applicability of major transition explanations turns on the details of the fossil record. This in itself suggests something about the integration of paleontological evidence and evolutionary theory.
On my view, the major transitions literature, in virtue of the being theory-led, need not incorporate paleontological perspectives into its explanations. However, paleontological data might have an epistemic role to play in constraining and determining the applicability or truth of those explanations. Consider a set of closely related questions about when, how, and through what mechanism transitions have occurred. In answering these questions, it strikes me that paleobiological perspectives, and potentially mass extinctions, are crucial. And indeed, I bet that investigations into major transitions are shifting into such a phenomena-led key. Perhaps ultimately, whether we think mass extinctions should be counted as major transitions should turn on how that integrative project goes. If it turns out that mass extinction events play a crucial enabling, triggering, or other-wise difference-making role in the occurrence of major transitions, then perhaps their majorness should be taken seriously even in that context.
